

# The Honeyynet

P R O J E C T

**Honeypots  
Today & Tomorrow**

## Speaker

- Involved in information security for over 10 years, 4 with Sun Microsystems as Senior Security Architect.
- Founder of the HoneyNet Project
- Published over 50 whitepapers, authored *Honeypots* and co-authored *Know Your Enemy*.
- Served 7 years in military, 4 as officer in Rapid Deployment Force.

# Why Honeypots

A great deal of the security profession (and the IT world) depend on honeypots, however few know it. Honeypots ...

- Build anti-virus signatures.
- Intelligence gathering (Symantec / Arbor)
- Build SPAM signatures and filters.
- Build RBL's for malicious websites.
- ISP's identify compromised systems.
- Assist law-enforcement to track criminals.
- Hunt and shutdown botnets.
- Malware collection and analysis.

March 9th, 2007

## How lucrative is pump-and-dump spam?

Posted by Ryan Naraine @ 10:23 am  
 Categories: Hackers, Browsers, Rootkits, Vulnerability research, Spam and Phishing, Spyware and Adware, Botnets, Exploit code, Data theft, McAfee, Symantec



**TALKBACK**  
 ADD YOUR OPINION

Worthwhile?



**+6**  
 6 VOTES

Are pump-and-dump spammers really making money from hyping penny stocks in e-mails? Paul Moriarty has the answer and it's an eyebrow-raising sight.

Over the last month, Moriarty, director of product development for Internet Content Security at Trend Micro, has been running a virtual portfolio of selling short on stocks found during spam runs. After 22 transactions in a five-week period, he has earned a whopping \$25,610.


**Short selling** (shorting) a stock is the act of profiting from a stock price going down. A short seller will typically borrow a security and sell it, expecting that it will decrease in value so that they can buy it back at a lower price and keep the difference.

During Moriarty's research, he used data from pump-and-dump e-mails flooding into Trend Micro's spam honeypots. "As soon as I see activity on a particular stock, I'll short that and set a limit to cover after I've made 10%. In just over five weeks, I've turned a 25.6 percent profit on a \$100,000 virtual portfolio. This is exactly what these spammers are doing. It's risky business but it's easy money," Moriarty said in an interview.

"I made money on every transaction," he added.

On the other hand, if he were to have fallen victim to "hot stock" e-mail tips and invested and held, Moriarty's portfolio would have been down 27.6 percent.

Shorting Pump & Dump Stocks  
 Cumulative Net Gains



Moriarty shared his research with me after the SEC's announcement yesterday that it had [suspended trading in 35 companies](#) whose shares were promoted in spam e-mails. (See [more from Larry Dignan](#))

Although the SEC move is to be

applauded, Moriarty sees it as a double-edged sword that creates an even bigger problem.

March 08, 2007

## Rinbot worm still hitting businesses

But there is 'no large global threat'

By Gregg Keizer

The Rinbot worm continues to pester and plague companies, several security organisations said, even as Symantec declared that its honeypot network had captured traffic showing that a botnet was spreading the malware.

## News

### Spam at all time high

Nine out of 10 e-mails will be spam by end 2007

Darren Paull (Computerworld) 22 February, 2007 12:36:28

Up to 90 percent of all e-mails will be spam by the end of this year, according to research released yesterday.

Security vendor Marshal's Threat Research and Content Engineering (TRACE) team monitored spam traffic from honeypots located across 18 countries and recorded a 30 percent increase over the last week which smashed global record levels.

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More by Darren Paull

ARN Distributors

Express Data

Top Stories

Saratoga filtering

ATLAS Dashboard: Global Summary

http://atlas.arbor.net/
Google

ATLAS Dashboard: Global Sum...

## 02 VULNERABILITY RISK INDEX (past 24 hours)

CVE	Age	Severity	Affected Products
<a href="#">CVE-2006-4696</a>	163 Days	Medium	Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Windows 2000, Windows XP
<a href="#">CVE-2006-4691</a>	128 Days	High	Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP
<a href="#">CVE-2006-4688</a>	128 Days	High	Microsoft Server 2003, XP, Windows 2000
<a href="#">CVE-2006-3439</a>	226 Days	High	Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Windows 2000, Windows XP
<a href="#">CVE-2006-2371</a>	282 Days	High	Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Windows 2000, Windows XP

[\[more\]](#)

## 03 TOP SCANNED SERVICES (past 24 hours)

Key	Service	Traffic per subnet	Latest CVE
■	TCP/139 (netbios-ssn)	1.05 MB	<a href="#">CVE-2006-5276</a>
■	TCP/445 (microsoft-ds)	941.19 kB	<a href="#">CVE-2006-5276</a>
■	ICMP/8	793.97 kB	
■	TCP/1433 (ms-sql-s)	585.43 kB	<a href="#">CVE-2004-1560</a>
■	UDP/137 (netbios-ns)	228.88 kB	<a href="#">CVE-2004-0445</a>
■	other	1.62 MB	

## 04 TOP THREAT SOURCES (past 24 hours)

COUNTRY
ASN
HOST

Country	Rank	Attacks per subnet	Scans per subnet	Botnets	Phishing	DoS
US (United States)	1	788	964.85 kB	263	1842	6149
CN (China)	2	502	1.06 MB	31	216	542
KR (South Korea)	3	187	856.96 kB	56	4052	5
PL (Poland)	4	632	300.63 kB	4	0	0
TW (Taiwan)	5	90	187.62 kB	27	0	22
FR (France)	6	124	179.05 kB	9	40	59
JP (Japan)	7	56	99.15 kB	11	43	89

malicious website. These downloaders usually appear on a system after a browser exploit is used to force their download and execution. This particular downloader will fetch and run a Bifrost variant.  
 Source: [TROJ\\_DELF.DWF](#)

**Title:** [Asterisk SIP Response Code Denial of Service](#)  
**Severity Level:** Normal Severity  
**Published:** Thursday, March 22, 2007 09:44  
 Another Asterisk SIP denial of service has been found when handling unexpected data. A SIP reply code of 0 is not handled properly, and the Asterisk process will crash when a reply with code is received. Asterisk has released version 1.4.2 to address this issue.  
 Source: [\[2/5\] Asterisk SIP Response Code Denial of Service](#)

**Title:** [Trojan.BAT.Crash.b](#)  
**Severity Level:** Normal Severity  
**Published:** Thursday, March 22, 2007 05:00  
 This is a Trojan injected into HTML documents. When the website is visited, it attempts to start Microsoft HTML Application host (%System%\mshta.exe), a standard program. Because this is missing on Windows 98, it may crash the computer.  
 Source: [Trojan.BAT.Crash.b](#)

[\[more\]](#)

## **What Are Honey pots**

A security resource who's value lies in the unauthorized or malicious interaction with it.

## **Their Value**

- Primary value of honeypots is to collect information.
- This information is then used to better identify, understand and protect against threats.
- Honeypots add little direct value to protecting your network.

## **Different Types**

- Server: Put the honeypot on the Internet and let the bad guys come to you.
- Client: Honeypot initiates and interacts with servers
- Other: Honeytokens, Proxies, Honeyfarms

## **Low vs High Interaction**


- The amount of activity a threat can have with a honeypot.
- Low-interaction emulates, high-interaction is the real thing.
- Neither solution is better, depends on what you want to achieve.

## Low-Interaction Server

Software that emulates functionality. Easier to deploy and automate, less risk, but customized to more specific attacks.

- Nepenthes
- Honeyd
- Honeytrap
- Web Applications
- KFSensor

# Nepenthes



## **Value: Malware Collection & Botnet Monitoring**

- Nepenthes retrieves malware following a successful attack.
- Malware designed to join command channel for remote control.
- Use same information, join with botnet monitoring software.

J4ck: why don't you start charging for packet attacks?

J4ck: "give me x amount and I'll take bla bla offline for this amount of time"

J1LL: it was illegal last I checked

J4ck: heh, then everything you do is illegal. Why not make money off of it?

**J4ck: I know plenty of people that'd pay exorbitant amounts for packeting**

```
ddos.synflood [host] [time] [delay] [port]
starts an SYN flood
```

```
ddos.httpflood [url] [number] [referrer] [recursive = true||false]
starts a HTTP flood
```

```
scan.listnetranges
list scanned netranges
```

```
scan.start
starts all enabled scanners
```

```
scan.stop
stops all scanners
```


```
http.download
download a file via HTTP
```

```
http.execute
updates the bot via the given HTTP URL
```

```
http.update
executes a file from a given HTTP URL
```

```
cvar.set spam_aol_channel [channel]
AOL Spam - Channel name
```


```
cvar.set spam_aol_enabled [1/0]
AOL Spam - Enabled?
```



## **High-Interaction Servers**

Typically real applications on real systems.  
Much more manual work, but more flexible  
in the data and threats it can capture.


# THE HONEYNET PROJECT



# No Data Control



# Data Control



# Phishing Server

```
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 14834 Jun 17 13:16 ebay only
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 247127 Jun 14 19:58 emailer2.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 7517 Jun 11 11:53 html1.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 10383 Jul 3 19:07 index.html
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 413 Jul 18 22:09 index.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 246920 Jun 14 20:38 massmail.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 8192 Jun 12 07:18 massmail.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 12163 Jun 9 01:31 send.php
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2094 Jun 20 11:49 sendspamAOL1.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2173 Jun 14 22:58 sendspamBUN1.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2783 Jun 15 00:21 sendspamBUNzip1.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2096 Jun 16 18:46 sendspamNEW1.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 1574 Jul 11 01:08 sendbank1.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2238 Jul 18 23:07 sendbankNEW.tgz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 83862 Jun 9 09:56 spamz.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 36441 Jul 18 00:52 usNEW.zip
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 36065 Jul 11 17:04 bank1.tgz
• drwxr-xr-x 2 free web 49 Jul 16 12:26 banka
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 301939 Jun 8 13:17 www1.tar.gz
• -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 327380 Jun 7 16:24 www1.zip
```

The screenshot shows the PayPal website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the PayPal logo and links for Sign Up, Log In, and Help. Below this is a secondary navigation bar with buttons for Welcome, Send Money, Request Money, Merchant Tools, and Auction Tools. The main content area features a Member Log-In section with fields for Email Address and Password, and a Log In button. To the right of the login section is a 'Join PayPal Today' section with a 'Sign Up Now!' button and a globe icon with the text 'Learn more about PayPal Worldwide'. Below these sections is a banner with the text 'The Fast Safe Easy Way to Pay' and an image of a smiling couple. To the right of the banner is an 'Enterprise Solutions' button with a 'Learn more' link. The bottom section of the page is divided into three columns: Buyers, eBay Sellers, and Merchants. Each column contains several links and short paragraphs describing PayPal's services. At the very bottom, there is a footer with a list of links (About, Accounts, Fees, Privacy, Security Center, Contact Us, User Agreement, Developers, Jobs, Buyer Credit, Referrals, Shops, Mass Pay), the text 'PayPal, an eBay company', and copyright information: 'Copyright © 1999-2005 PayPal. All rights reserved. Information about FDIC pass-through insurance'. There are also two small logos at the bottom: 'Reviewed by TRUSTE' and 'PRIVACY'.

PayPal - Welcome

[Sign Up](#) | [Log In](#) | [Help](#)

Welcome | Send Money | Request Money | Merchant Tools | Auction Tools

**Member Log-In** [Forgot your email address?](#) [Forgot your password?](#)

Email Address

Password

**Join PayPal Today**  
Now Over  
78 million accounts

Learn more about [PayPal Worldwide](#)

**The Fast Safe Easy Way to Pay**

PayPal is the global leader in online payments. [Find out more](#)

**Enterprise Solutions**  
[Learn more](#)

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PayPal is [free to use](#).

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Learn about [sending payments](#) through PayPal.

**eBay Sellers**

[Free eBay tools](#) make selling easier.

PayPal works hard to help [protect sellers](#).

PayPal simplifies [shipping and tracking](#).

[Earn cashback](#) with PayPal Preferred Rewards.

**Merchants**

[Accept credit cards](#) on your website using PayPal.

[Compare our solutions](#) to merchant accounts and gateways

[Low fees](#) make PayPal the affordable choice.

Learn why PayPal is [good for business](#).


[About](#) | [Accounts](#) | [Fees](#) | [Privacy](#) | [Security Center](#) | [Contact Us](#) | [User Agreement](#) | [Developers](#) | [Jobs](#) | [Buyer Credit](#) | [Referrals](#) | [Shops](#) | [Mass Pay](#)

**PayPal, an eBay company**

Copyright © 1999-2005 PayPal. All rights reserved.  
[Information about FDIC pass-through insurance](#)

Reviewed by TRUSTE

PRIVACY



Hackers in the House

[http://www.philippinehoneynet.org/dataarchive.php?date=2006-07-24](#)

# The Philippine HoneyNet Project

about us data projects training members papers

## HoneyNet Activity Monitor Report Archive 2006-07-24

### Hackers in the House

At around 3:57 PM, we noticed some strange activity picked up in our honeynet logs. After a bit of investigation, we noted that an attacker was snooping around one of our honeypots.

In this version of our "advisory", I will show you a sample of the activity that we've picked up. Here is a step by step walkthrough of the start of the attack session:

[Step 1](#)  
Our attacker begins his activities by opening up a command shell.

[Step 2](#)  
Our attacker next issues the "ipconfig" command, an obvious starting point.

[Step 3](#)  
Attacker issues a net user command. The net user command creates and/or modifies user accounts on computers. Attacker tries to change the "TslnternetUser" account password. The attacker is successful. He or she now "owns" an account in the honeypot.

[Step 4](#)  
Attacker issues another net user command, this time to deactivate the "guest" user account.

[Step 5](#)  
Attacker issues a net localgroup command. The net localgroup command modifies local groups in the computer. In this case, he adds the "TslnternetUser" into the administrator group. The command is successful. The attacker has now escalated his/her priveledges.

[Step 6](#)  
Attacker uses tftp to download a file called mt.exe from a remote server. Attacker is unsuccessful. Further research indicates "mt.exe" as a backdoor tool. It probably overwrites the original Windows mt.exe backup utility.

[Step 7](#)  
Attacker tries to issue a command to "mt.exe" with a "-findpass" parameter. I'm not sure what the command does since I could only presume that this is somehow related to system passwords though unlikely since the attacker has administrator access already. It is most likely a command to search and steal stored passwords in files and documents in the system. Obviously, this command is unsuccessful since the "mt.exe" download was unsuccessful.

## Client Based Honeypots

Threats change, and so do the technologies. Bad guys have moved to client based attacks, they let the victims come to them.


- Capture-HPC (high interaction)
- HoneyC (low interaction)
- Microsoft Strider Honeymonkey

# McAfee SiteAdvisor™

- HOME
- DOWNLOAD
- ANALYSIS
- SUPPORT
- BLOG
- ABOUT US

We test the Web to help keep you safe from spyware, spam, viruses and online scams.

- Why trust us?
- Why isn't the security software you already have enough?
- Do sites pay us to be rated?



**Mapping the Mal Web:**  
[Which domains are the riskiest?](#)


**Download SiteAdvisor now**  
For Firefox *It's free!*



**Be a Web safety hero:**  
[Play SiteAdvisor WebQuest!](#)



Look up a site report:

# Capture-HPC



<http://www.nz-honeynet.org/capture.html>

# HoneyC



<http://www.nz-honeynet.org/honeyc.html>


# Microsoft Strider HoneyMonkey



## Other

- Web 2.0 - Fake Myspace accounts
- Google Honeytrap (search engine entries)
- Honeyfarms - Honeytrap
- Honeytokens
- Proxy Honeytraps
- Anti-Spam Honeytraps

# Google Honeypot



PHPFM 0.2.3 - a file manager written in PHP

http://ghh.sourceforge.net/demo/GHH%20-%20PHPFM/index.php

PHPFM 0.2.3 - a file manager ... GHH - Installation.gif (GIF imag...

# PHPFM 0.2.3

Create new folder
 Create new file
 Upload files
 Log out

Index of . /											
Name	Rn	Rm	Name	Size	Perm	Modified	Vw	Ed	Rn	DI	Rm
.			index.php	2,81 KB	666	20:36 06-19-2003					
..			readme.txt	2,13 KB	666	22:26 06-19-2003					
conf											
docs											
icon											
incl											
lang											

Powered by PHPFM 0.2.3  
Copyright © 2002 Morten Bojsen-Hansen

This page was produced in 0.0442 seconds.

# THE HONEYNET PROJECT

www.myspace.com/\_honeypot\_

http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile

Myspace.com

www.myspace.com/\_honeypot\_

MySpace Search powered by Google

Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds

## Honeypot

"Honeypot"



Female  
16 years old  
REDMOND, ALABAMA  
United States

Last Login: 3/13/2007

View My: [Pics](#) | [Videos](#)

### Contacting Honeypot

<a href="#">Send Message</a>	<a href="#">Forward to Friend</a>
<a href="#">Add to Friends</a>	<a href="#">Add to Favorites</a>
<a href="#">Instant Message</a>	<a href="#">Block User</a>
<a href="#">Add to Group</a>	<a href="#">Rank User</a>

**MySpace URL:**  
[http://www.myspace.com/\\_honeypot\\_](http://www.myspace.com/_honeypot_)

### Honeypot's Interests

<b>Music</b>	Top 10 MySpace Layouts
	1) <a href="#">Freeweblayouts.net</a>
	2) <a href="#">Blinkyou</a>
	3) <a href="#">Freecodesource</a>
	4) <a href="#">Mynicespace</a>
	5) <a href="#">Hotfreelayouts</a>
	6) <a href="#">Pimpmyspace.org</a>
	7) <a href="#">Bigoo</a>
	8) <a href="#">Nuclearcentury</a>
	9) <a href="#">Blogadorn</a>
	10) <a href="#">NewWorldVisitorMap</a>

Data provided by [LiveCrunch - MySpace Layouts](#)

## Honeypot is in your extended network

Honeypot's Latest Blog Entry [[Subscribe to this Blog](#)]

[[View All Blog Entries](#)]

### Honeypot's Blurbs

**About me:**



29 visitors marked! **Honeypot's friends**  
You've been marked on my visitor map!


**Who I'd like to meet:**

### Honeypot's Friend Space

Honeypot has 3 friends.

 <p>Tom</p>	 <p>Vegas</p>	 <p>THEY CANT REPORT US ALL</p>
---	--	--

# Honeymole



# Spam Honeytokens

Most Recent Spam Harvesters | Project Honey Pot

http://www.projecthoneypot.org/top\_harvesters.php

PROJECT HONEY POT BETA

Welcome to Project Honey Pot | [Login](#)  
[Fund the Cause](#) | [Buy Swag](#)  
[Refer a Friend](#)  
[Terms of Use](#)

Home Data Help About

Harvesters Spam Servers Dictionary Attackers Lookup IPs Statistics

## Most Recent Harvester List

This page displays the top spam harvesters by different categories. You may sort or limit this list by selecting from the menus below.

Most Recent

From All Countries

See [comment spammers](#), [dictionary attackers](#), or [mail servers](#) from the same region.


You may also [lookup information](#) on a specific IP address.

If you want to see a list of the spam harvesters specifically targeting your own websites simply [join Project Honey Pot](#) and add honey pots to the

The list below is comprised of the **"Most Recent" Harvesters** (limited to the top 25 — [login](#) to see more).

Harvester IP	Sightings	First Seen	Last Seen
70.104.26.10	4	2007-03-13	2007-03-22
67.19.112.10	6	2007-02-05	2007-03-20
62.194.12.141	123	2006-12-02	2007-03-20
220.66.60.212	30	2007-02-28	2007-03-20
69.109.74.201	14	2007-02-25	2007-03-20
58.22.131.13	123	2006-07-04	2007-03-20
64.2.4.49	19	2007-03-05	2007-03-20
62.194.10.101	156	2007-01-13	2007-03-20
89.98.245.11	12	2007-03-10	2007-03-20
62.194.16.131	468	2006-11-14	2007-03-20
71.1.43.213	50	2007-02-22	2007-03-20

# Proxy Honeypot



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Open Proxy Honeypot - Web Application Security Consortium". The address bar displays "http://www.webappsec.org/projects/honeypots/". The page content includes the WASC logo and navigation menu. The main heading is "Distributed Open Proxy Honeypots". The text discusses the challenges of web-based honeypots and the project's goal of using open proxy servers to gather intelligence. A list of contributors is provided on the left side.

Open Proxy Honeypot - Web Application Security Consortium

http://www.webappsec.org/projects/honeypots/

Open Proxy Honeypot - Web A...

Web Application Security Consortium

Home :: About Us :: Projects :: Library :: News :: Links :: Contact Us

## *Distributed Open Proxy Honeypots*

From a counter-intelligence perspective, standard honeypot/honeynet technologies have not bared much fruit in the way of web attack data. Web-based honeypots have not been as successful as OS level or other honeypot applications (such as SMTP) due to the lack of their perceived value. Deploying an attractive honeypot web site is a complicated, time-consuming task. Other than a Script Kiddie probing for an easy defacement or an indiscriminant worm, you just won't get much traffic.

So the question is - How can we increase our traffic, and thus, our chances of obtaining valuable web attack reconnaissance?

This project will use one of the web attacker's most trusted tools against him - the Open Proxy server. Instead of being the target of the attacks, we opt to be used as a conduit of the attack data in order to gather our intelligence. By deploying multiple, specially configured open proxy server (or proxypot), we aim to take a birds-eye look at the types of malicious traffic that traverse these systems. The honeypot systems will conduct real-time analysis on the HTTP traffic to categorize the requests into threat classifications outlined by the [Web Security Threat Classification](#) and report all logging data to a centralized location.

**Contributors**

**Ryan Barnett\***  
**Jeremiah Grossman**  
**Prince Kohil**  
**Ivan Ristic**  
**Robert Auger**  
**Anton Chuvakin**

**\*Project Leader**

## **Future**

- Continue to grow in use, but not in the public eye.
- Continue to diversify, solutions designed around specific threats.
- Better automated data analysis.

## **Summary**

- Honeypots very powerful and heavily used, but not widely known.
- Many different types, each with own advantages and disadvantages.

## Contact Us

<http://www.honeynet.org>

<project@honeynet.org>